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The logic of aboriginal rights
DUNCAN IVISON
University of Sydney, Australia
ABSTRACT Are there any aboriginal rights? If there are, then what kind of
rights are they? Are they human rights adapted and shaped to the circumstances
of indigenous peoples? Or are they specific cultural rights, exclusive to members of
aboriginal societies? In recent liberal political theory, aboriginal rights are often
conceived of as cultural rights and thus as group rights. As a result, they are vulner-
able to at least three kinds of objections: i) that culture is not a primary good
relevant to the currency of egalitarian justice; ii) that group rights are inimical to
the moral individualism of liberal democratic societies; and iii) that pandering to
group interests provides incentives for abuse and undermines the conditions
required for promoting liberal egalitarian outcomes. My argument is that a success-
ful defense of aboriginal rights will tie them to the promotion of the equal freedom
of aboriginal people, both in the formal and substantive senses, and thus to improve-
ments in their actual wellbeing, both as ‘peoples’ and individuals. But rights and
norms interact in complex ways, and the translation of particular individual and
social goods into the language of rights is always fraught with difficulty.
KEYWORDS equality  freedom  indigenous peoples  norms  rights
Are there any aboriginal rights? If there are, what kind of rights are they?
Are they legal rights granted by the state? Are they human rights adapted
and shaped according to the circumstances and self-understanding of
indigenous peoples? Or are they specific cultural rights, exclusive to
members of aboriginal societies? From the perspective of indigenous
peoples, at least as I understand it, their rights stem from their own collec-
tive lives, self-understandings, political philosophies and practices. And
they are justified in light of them. From the outside, however, they refer to
a bundle of specific interests that need to be justified to others. In law they
refer to a complex amalgam of common law rights, treaty rights (in some,
but not all circumstances), basic rights and the collective human right of
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self-determination. I shall try to lay out these various lineaments below. But
what makes them aboriginal rights as opposed to just rights? How do they
fit with other kinds of rights, like general citizenship rights? And in what
sense are others under a duty to respect them?
In recent liberal political theory, aboriginal rights are often conceived of
as cultural rights and thus as group rights. As a result, they are vulnerable
to at least three kinds of objections: i) that culture is not a primary good
relevant to the currency of egalitarian justice; ii) that group rights are
inimical to the moral individualism of liberal democratic societies; and iii)
that pandering to group interests provides incentives for abuse and under-
mines the conditions required for promoting liberal egalitarian outcomes.
I shall address these objections below.
I am also concerned with the nature of rights in general. How does the
language of rights help or hinder the claims made by indigenous peoples?
A crucial feature of the discussion below is the relation between rights and
norms. Rights are often opposed to norms in the sense that the former are
universal and the latter particular. But norms shape not only our under-
standing of what rights mean, but when it is appropriate to claim or insist
on them. So how do norms insinuate themselves into choices and,
conversely, how do rights reshape social and cultural norms?
THE NATURE OF RIGHTS
There is no definitive or categorical account of a right, and yet rights
discourse is one of the most powerful discourses in contemporary domestic
and global politics. But there is a difference between saying that the nature
of rights is conceptually ambiguous and that it is essentially empty. For
some, rights have deep conceptual and normative roots in the kinds of
people and institutions characteristic of liberal democratic societies – free,
dynamic, individualistic and pluralistic. Rights acknowledge the inherent
fact of equal human agency (Ignatieff, 2001: 163–4). In this sense, they are
foundational to and can be used as a means of evaluating basic political
institutions and practices. For others, the connection between rights and
human agency is more contingent and functional. Relations of power are
constitutive of social and political practices and so too of our practices of
rights. Hence rights can serve a strategic function in practices of freedom,
but are not foundational to political analysis and thus should enjoy no privi-
leged analytical or normative position within it. Rights are derivative of
some more general story about human wellbeing, a theory of justice or
power (or all three).
If one’s understanding of rights is something like the first of these, then
the problem of whether there are any aboriginal rights is potentially acute.
ETHNICITIES 3(3)
 at UNIV OF WESTERN ONTARIO on August 19, 2012etn.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
323
What work does the modifier ‘aboriginal’ actually do here? There may be
conceptual and normative constraints on what you understand a right to be,
such that the very idea of an aboriginal right is deeply confused. On the
other hand, if your view tends towards the second, as mine does, then you
are faced with a similar type of question, but this time from a very different
direction: what is the point of appealing to the language of rights given the
fact that it offers only a contingent and potentially highly contestable source
of support for the kinds of claims that indigenous peoples are making?
Rights are valuable, I shall argue, to the extent that they protect or promote
certain crucial interests that individuals and groups have. These interests
have to be important enough to impose duties on others to either perform
or forbear from certain kinds of actions, and, to be effective, they will have
to be legally enforceable. This is true of both negative and positive rights,
since even negative rights of forbearance – for example, those to do with
property rights – require active governmental protection and intervention
(see Geuss, 2001: 131–52; Holmes and Sunstein, 1999).
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal theorists, as well as those on the left and
the right, are often skeptical about aboriginal rights. The conceptual
trimmers fear inflation and worry about linking the notion of rights to
culturally-specific claims at all, since this detracts from the values of
equality and universality which they argue are central to our understand-
ing of them. Aboriginal theorists, on the other hand, such as Taiaiake
Alfred, argue that aboriginal rights are merely the ‘benefits accrued by
indigenous peoples who have agreed to abandon their autonomy in order
to enter the legal and political framework of the state’ (1999: 140; see also
57–8; for a contrary view, see Behrendt, 2001a; Borrows, 1997; Willliams,
1990). In Australia, Noel Pearson (a prominent Aboriginal activist,
community leader and lawyer) has argued that the focus on aboriginal
rights and especially the right to self-determination has deflected attention
from the deep social and economic problems afflicting indigenous
communities. The focus on rights might have even made things worse.1
These are powerful criticisms and point to how rights exist within various
kinds of relations of power, as opposed to standing over or outside of them.
On my view, claims about rights are about entitlements of some kind and
have basically a quadratic structure (Shapiro, 1986). To say A has a right to
X is to commit yourself to providing an account of: i) who or what is the
subject of the entitlement; ii) what is the substance of the entitlement; iii)
what is the basis of the entitlement; and iv) what the purpose of the entitle-
ment is. Thus, two of the most influential analytic accounts of rights in
recent years – the ‘choice’ and ‘interest’ accounts of rights – reflect different
substantive relationships between these variables. According to the choice
account, for example, the concept of a right refers to an uncontested
domain of choice for the individual and consists in the ‘normative allocation
of freedom’, as Hillel Steiner puts it (Kramer et al., 1998: 238). To be a rights
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bearer is to have control over the duty in question in the sense of being able
to demand or waive the performance of an action. For Hart (1984), a ‘right
to liberty’ is fundamental to and presupposed by all other claims about indi-
vidual rights, and rights claims are therefore incapable of being attributed
to things that cannot exercise the powers and waivers central to this
account, such as babies, the very old, horses or a forest. This clearly isn’t a
value-free account of rights, but rather one intended for modern, market-
based liberal societies, where there is a concern to protect the formal struc-
ture of the law from being encroached by the fickle demands of policy
(Kramer et al., 1998: 213). Thus, to protect the ‘integrity’ of rights, and
particularly the pre-emptory value of choice, rights should be seen as a set
of protected options – or negative freedoms – that stand independently of
other kinds of interests.
According to the interest account, on the other hand, the value of choice
may be an important interest, but not pre-emptory, and thus it will have to
be balanced against other interests as well. To say A has a right to X is to
say that someone else has a duty to perform some act (or omission) that is
in A’s interest.2 The interest has to be such that its protection or advance-
ment can be accepted as a reason sufficient for holding some other
person(s) to be under a duty. To appeal to a right is not to have already
justified the interest in question, but rather to be asserting it, and thus some
further justification has to be forthcoming. This moves us much more
directly into the domain of contested moral beliefs than the choice theory
does and is all the more plausible for it. It also brings to the fore the muta-
bility and contestability of claims about interests, and thus about rights, and
highlights the inherent indeterminacy of the language of rights. As we shall
see, this indeterminacy offers room for the flexible adaptation of rights to
new circumstances and contexts.
WHAT ARE ABORIGINAL RIGHTS?
I think the interest theory of rights is a good approach for thinking about
aboriginal rights in general for two reasons: first, because rights are not self-
justifying, and this approach focuses our attention explicitly on the under-
lying interests involved and the moral arguments required to justify those
interests; and, second, because since interests clearly change over time and
according to different circumstances, we should expect our understanding
of rights to be similarly mutable. Both point to the contestability of rights
claims and also to the way that they always stand within politics and
relations of power instead of outside of them.
Our challenge then is to answer three questions: i) what are the interests
at stake with regard to aboriginal rights?; ii) why are they important enough
ETHNICITIES 3(3)
 at UNIV OF WESTERN ONTARIO on August 19, 2012etn.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
325
to put others under a duty?; and iii) who in particular acquires these
duties?3 Before moving directly to a consideration of these questions, let
me say something more about the ambiguity inherent to the notion of
‘aboriginal rights’ in the first place.
A challenge facing anyone defending aboriginal rights is in making clear
what we mean when we call them aboriginal rights. Two general avenues
present themselves: first, one can appeal to the historical, cultural and
political specificity of the interests to which the claims appeal – in other
words, to indigenous difference; and, second, one can appeal to general or
human rights and argue that aboriginal rights are a species of these kinds
of rights in that they refer to interests that everyone deserves to have
protected or promoted (qua human).
Note some of the dangers in choosing the first avenue to the exclusion
of any other. If indigenous peoples are owed rights on the grounds of their
radical ‘otherness’ from Europeans and of their having suffered grievous
harm as a result of this otherness, then it is not clear whether, if their
circumstances change or they borrow from other cultures and traditions,
they thereby undermine the basis of the cultural distinctiveness that is said
to give rise to these rights. So the second avenue seems a more promising
route to travel, but raises various difficulties of its own.
Let me turn to a more detailed treatment of the kind of justifications we
find at this point. Consider first the ‘common law doctrine of aboriginal
rights’. In recent Canadian jurisprudence, at least, this refers to the legal
rights of aboriginal peoples as they were recognized in the custom gener-
ated by relations between aborigines and incoming French and English
settlers from the 17th century onwards and especially in the treaty process
initiated between they and the Crown (although treaties were not struck
with all indigenous nations). According to Brian Slattery, the doctrine of
aboriginal rights is a basic principle of Canadian common law which
‘defines the constitutional links between the Crown and aboriginal peoples
and regulates the interplay between Canadian systems of law and govern-
ment and native land rights, customary laws and political institutions’
(Slattery, 1987: 732).
As Slattery and others explain, this doctrine emerged out of three broad
sets of circumstances: i) the realities of life in North America in the 17th
and 18th centuries and the uneasy interdependency that often existed
between colonial and aboriginal societies; ii) the broad rules of equity and
convenience; and iii) imperial policy. These emergent principles ‘were part
of a special branch of British law that governed the Crown’s relations with
its overseas dominions, commonly termed “colonial law” or “imperial
constitutional law” ’ (1987: 736–7). These rules, Slattery claims, form a body
of unwritten law known as ‘the doctrine of aboriginal rights’ (the part
dealing specifically with land being the ‘doctrine of aboriginal title’ and the
other parts dealing with treaties, customary law, powers of self-government
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and the fiduciary role of the Crown). The crucial legal point is that this
doctrine applied automatically to a new colony when it was acquired and
‘supplied the presumptive legal structure governing the position of native
peoples’. In other words, ‘the doctrine was part of a body of fundamental
constitutional law that was logically prior to the introduction of English
common law . . . [and] limits and moulds the application of that law to
native peoples’ (1987: 737–8). Slattery argues that this provides the legal
basis for the survival of ‘native customary law’ in Canada (as it does, by
analogy, in Australia as well, although important historical, constitutional
and legal differences remain). This doctrine was recognized by the courts
to varying degrees from the 19th century onwards, but only really came into
play in Canada with the Calder decision in 1971 and arguably in Australia
with the Mabo decision in 1992 (Ivison, 1997).
On this reading, the doctrine of aboriginal rights is a body of intersoci-
etal law – a ‘bridge constructed from both sides’, as the Canadian Report of
the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (1996) puts it – based on the
original rights of aboriginal nations as these were recognized by the various
imperial and colonial powers. The rights to which it refers – to land, to fish
and hunt, to special linguistic, cultural and religious rights, to the continu-
ity of aboriginal law and to the right of self-government – are ‘inherent’ in
that they originate ‘from the collective lives and traditions of these people
themselves rather than from the Crown or Parliament’ (R v Sparrow, 1990)
and are to be ‘interpreted flexibly so as to permit their evolution over time’
(Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, 1996). This is a
crucial feature of aboriginal rights that has been frequently emphasized by
indigenous activists and leaders. These rights coexist with those of the
Crown and do not derive from them (Report of the Royal Commission on
Aboriginal Peoples, 1996: 675–95; Venne, 1998; Yunupingu, 1997).
Now, as a common law doctrine, this means that aboriginal rights are
vulnerable to being overridden or modified by legislation, subject to any
constitutional barriers and usually to payment of compensation. But even
when constitutional or legislative barriers exist, rights are still sensitive to
government reasons for action – as indigenous peoples have always known,
even with the arrival of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in
1982 and in Australia since 1993 with the passage of the Native Title Act.
So the ‘reconciliation’ of aboriginal rights with Crown sovereignty remains
controversial.
Thus, one very influential way of understanding aboriginal rights is to
think of them as common law rights – as legal rights, in other words, that
emerge from a complex cross-cultural practice of treaty-making – and as
being already inside and thus enforceable by the law, seen now as a body
of intersocietal law.4 This is a legal argument, but it has also been invoked
as a normative model as well, most notably by James Tully (1995) and also,
albeit to a different extent, by Jacob Levy (2000). The idea here is that the
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common law approach offers a context-sensitive and complex intersocietal
model for thinking about cross-cultural negotiations. For Tully, this means
picking out those norms that emerge out of actual negotiations between
peoples, given the particular historical and political situation between them.
Aboriginal rights, according to this reading, form the basis of treaty nego-
tiations between indigenous peoples and the state and are not derivative
from it. For Levy, on the other hand, the common law approach presup-
poses the legitimacy of the extant sovereignty of the Crown and merely
offers a hospitable structure for hosting distinctive indigenous property
rights, which are ultimately subject to the regulation of (and potential
extinction by) the state, given the need to protect the interests of persons.
Note two general issues concerning the common law approach here. If
it is aboriginal difference that justifies the interests that aboriginal rights are
said to protect, then they may be required to stick very closely to those
values, practices and institutions associated with aboriginal societies prior
to their contact with European ones (Asch, 1999: 436–7), which may restrict
their capacity to adapt and develop those interests in light of contemporary
realities (for example, should an aboriginal right to fish on certain waters
extend only to ‘ceremonial’ purposes or include the right to fish commer-
cially?). Or, if the argument entails granting exclusive rights to peoples, this
may threaten the interests of vulnerable or less powerful members of those
groups. On the other hand, as we have seen, the common law usually
presupposes the legitimacy of the extant sovereignty of the Crown. But how
can this be reconciled with the fact that, prior to first contact with Euro-
peans, natives were, as one Canadian judge put it recently, ‘independent
nations, occupying and controlling their own territories’ (R. v van der Peet,
1996: para. 106)? When did they give up those self-government rights or
have them extinguished and on what basis?
Hence the attraction of broadening our understanding of aboriginal
rights to include reference to more abstract principles associated with
human and political rights. If aboriginal peoples have rights as peoples to
self-determination in international law or according to the values of
freedom and equality, then the common law incorporation of aboriginal
rights can be understood differently. If indigenous peoples were sovereign
and self-determining at the time of settlement, then Crown sovereignty
could only be reconciled with their sovereignty through some mechanism
of consent, or at least through means consistent with their freedom and
equality. History tells us that this did not occur, but the ideal serves as a
counterfactual for rethinking relations in the present.
So let us return to the three questions posed at the beginning of this
section. The interests to which aboriginal rights refer are a bundle of
specific rights to do with ownership and control over their lands and the
various activities that occur on those lands; with political rights of self-
government; and with their rights as citizens of both aboriginal nations and
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the wider country in which they reside. The interests will be normatively
compelling insofar as they protect and promote the basic interests of
indigenous peoples, both individually and collectively. The duty of protect-
ing these rights falls upon the Crown (the state), aboriginal governments,
aboriginal and non-aboriginal citizens and, to a lesser extent, the inter-
national community (in upholding basic human rights, the state has
committed itself to protecting these through various international treaties
and covenants).
SOME OBJECTIONS
There are three sets of objections to aboriginal rights: legal, conceptual and
normative. I shall deal with the first two relatively quickly here and then
turn to the third, to do with the nature of group rights, in the next section.
Legal objections to aboriginal rights take aim at revisionist claims about
the intersocietal basis of constitutional law and the validity of aboriginal
title and laws after the imposition of British sovereignty (at least in North
America and Australasia). Thus, one objection to aboriginal rights is that
they are merely those positive rights granted by the Crown and enforceable
according to the extant legal system. Any so-called ‘inherent’ rights, such
as they are, were extinguished by the imposition of sovereignty at the time
of settlement through the doctrine of discovery. From a strictly legal
perspective, however, this argument has been rejected, albeit slowly and
unevenly, by US, Canadian, New Zealand and Australian courts in the face
of fairly strong historical and legal evidence. The courts have acknowledged
that various kinds of aboriginal legal interests, especially concerning
property, did in fact survive settlement and continue today. The question
of sovereignty remains unclear and intractable, at least as a legal matter,
because courts are not in a position to easily question the basic sovereignty
of the state (hence the importance placed by indigenous peoples on political
negotiations with the state and in international forums such as the United
Nations).
Conceptual objections focus on the apparent incoherence of linking the
notion of a right to claims that are not clearly tied to interests to do with
individual choice and freedom. Thus, according to this argument, ‘aborigi-
nal rights’ are an example of the grievous inflation of the currency of rights.
The defender of aboriginal rights has erred according to some established
common usage of the word ‘right’, but this holds only if there is some
agreed-upon currency in the first place. Try as the ‘will’ or ‘choice’ theorist
does to insist that there is, there clearly is not.
Ontological objections to aboriginal rights presume that they are inher-
ently collective in nature. If so, according to this objection, then they violate
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the essentially individualistic nature of rights and the moral individualism
and ontology of liberalism more generally. Conversely, if liberal rights are
inherently individualistic, and aboriginal political theory is not, then, from
an aboriginal perspective, they are ill-suited to promoting aboriginal ends
(Alfred, 1999; cf. Borrows, 1997). Once again, the problem is not a concep-
tual one, since there is no intrinsic reason against assigning rights to groups,
as it is clear that, among the goods that individuals value, are collective
goods and thus it is plausible to think this might entail group rights. From
a practical perspective, our legal and political system is full of group rights.
The more precise worry is about the kinds of group rights that aboriginal
rights might entail and whether these are consistent with liberal norms
more generally. Let’s look at this question a bit more carefully.
GROUP RIGHTS
Rights are reason-dependent claims, and these reasons draw on both indi-
vidual and societal interests. To use some familiar examples, a right to free
speech can be defended in terms of the value of autonomy, or the market-
place of ideas, or the social conditions necessary for exercising free and
uninhibited speech, including the capacity of marginalized groups to partici-
pate in public discourse. Some of these arguments refer not only to the
interests of the individual beneficiary – the right holder – but also to society
more generally. A right to property can be justified in terms of the value of
autonomy, but also in terms of promoting economic prosperity. And so on.
To be sure, the rights mentioned above also immunize the choices and
decisions of individuals from state interference and from the smothering
conformity of what Locke calls ‘the law of opinion’. It may be that certain
so-called ‘core rights’ are best justified on the basis of individual interests
alone,5 but it is difficult to detach the value of individual rights entirely,
even the classic liberal rights, from collective interests or public goods (see
Raz, 1994). Freedom of speech, assembly and religion all contribute to the
good of democratic legitimacy and the creation of (potentially) liberal and
tolerant cultures.6 These basic rights often do promote cultural or societal
heterogeneity, but their presence is not necessarily a sufficient condition for
it. For example, individual behavior that falls too far outside the bounds of
the norms and values of the dominant culture is unlikely to be protected by
individual rights. In fact, individual rights can often serve to align individual
behavior with collective norms and values as much as immunize it from
them (Post, 2000). A right to sue for defamation or invasion of privacy
aligns behavior with cultural beliefs about decency or civility. Certain kinds
of speech (for example, ‘fighting words’) may fall outside the moral, but
also partly cultural bounds of individual rights to freedom of speech. And
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a right to be immunized from certain kinds of interference might embody
various cultural norms or assumptions about the proper scope of law or
government or the line between public and private, as feminist critics point
out. Thus, where a dominant culture exerts a strong or even hegemonic
influence, individual rights may do little to promote or protect diversity.
Dominant languages drive out minority ones when the cost of protecting or
promoting the latter becomes too high. Communal ownership of land can
be made increasingly difficult in a legal and political system that promotes
individual ownership above all else.
These kinds of concerns characterize the recent surge of work in political
philosophy on group rights. The relation between group and individual
rights is complex.7 Sometimes group interests are best protected by assign-
ing legal rights to individuals, such as when we protect the collective right
of a group by assigning legal rights to individual members to engage in
group-specific activities. At other times, a group right protects group inter-
ests by being assigned to the group and not its individual members, as, for
example, when we say that ‘aboriginal title’ (or ‘native title’) lies with the
tribe rather than its members.8 This empowers groups and puts incentives
in place for them to organize themselves in order to be recognized by the
state as possessing the appropriate legal and moral standing. Thus, group
rights, like individual rights, may or may not promote cultural and societal
heterogeneity. Group rights are compatible with the loose moral indi-
vidualism of liberalism as long as those rights can be connected to promot-
ing or protecting the legitimate interests of individuals in some way –
interests they have qua individuals, but also those they might share jointly
with others (and which are not simply those private interests that happen
to be shared by everyone).
One way to think of the differences here is to distinguish between ‘collec-
tive’ and ‘corporate’ conceptions of group rights.9 On the collective concep-
tion, a group right serves to protect or promote those interests that
individuals have jointly with others and that are sufficient to impose duties
upon others. The right is held by the group, but the interests that make the
case for the right are the separate (although identical) interests of the
group’s members. The moral standing required for the rights claim is
provided by the moral standing of the several individuals that make up the
group. According to the corporate conception, on the other hand, the moral
standing is ascribed to the group as such. The right is not held jointly by the
individual members, but by the group as a unitary entity.
When we think of a group right in this corporate sense, the interests or
values it serves are independent of the legitimate interests of the individuals
who identify or associate with it. This can amount to saying that a culture
or group is intrinsically good and worth preserving regardless of the desires,
beliefs or interests of the individuals who identify with it. Sometimes the
value of a nation or a people is defended in these terms. If so, then these
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kinds of group rights appear to be in conflict with basic liberal norms. So
where does this leave the defender of aboriginal rights? Are they necess-
arily committed to the corporate conception of group rights? One example
might be the right to self-determination. On the corporate conception, this
right is owed to the group independently of the claims of individual
members. The right is universal insofar as it is held by all tokens of the
corporate type (Jones, 1999a: 89). On the collective conception, the right is
held jointly by the individuals who make up each nation or people and will
be grounded in the interests they share in living in a self-determining
political community because of the connections between self-determination
and individual wellbeing, or at least the right not to be oppressed or
discriminated against in various ways. The right is universal insofar as the
interests it serves are universal to all human beings. Thus, if aboriginal
rights include group rights in the collective as opposed to the corporate
sense, then they are compatible with a family of liberal arguments about
human rights (although there may still be deep disagreements over the
kinds of interests at stake). The limits to any local ‘hybridization’ of rights
are established with reference to these collective interests.
However, it is also clear that indigenous peoples’ rights are often spoken
of in the corporate sense. One reason for this is to do with imputing identity
across time. A cultural group may claim a group right in order to ensure its
survival into the future, as opposed to its mere security in the present.
Aboriginal property rights, which reside in the group as opposed to the indi-
vidual members per se, seem to require a corporate identity stretching back
into the past and forward into the future. Group rights premised on reparat-
ing a people or tribe for historical wrongs seem to require this too, since it
refers to a possessor not entirely reducible to the current members of the
group (see Ivison, 2002: Ch. 5; Jones, 1999b: 367). The self-understanding
of a group often takes on this corporate cast. So as much as a conceptual
distinction can be drawn between collective and corporate group rights, in
practice they can become entwined and difficult to separate.
One prominent example of the corporate conception at work can be
found in John Rawls’s The Law of Peoples (1999) insofar as he treats
‘peoples’ as the fundamental moral unit of international society. For Rawls,
there is an analogy between the restriction on appealing to comprehensive
doctrines at the domestic level to justify the coercive institutions of the state
and, at the international level, with regard to justifying international law.
He does not think that this means that human rights are impossible, just
that they will have to form a narrower subset of rights common to all
‘decent’ societies as opposed to fully liberal ones – ‘decent’ in the sense of
falling short of satisfying liberal principles of justice, but not too far short.10
So Rawls is willing to take the corporate identity of groups seriously and
then try to balance it against other kinds of interests that liberals seek to
protect.
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Rawls’s theory has been subject to extensive criticism. One general
problem is that, as a theory of international justice, it seems to tolerate far
too much, including discrimination against minorities, wide disparities in
political power and undemocratic political arrangements. More specifically,
the analogy between the domestic case and the international one breaks
down. First, according to Rawls, the kind of pluralism that is relevant to a
theory of justice at the domestic level is reasonable pluralism, which is a
product of the free exercise of reason under free institutions (Rawls, 1993:
144; see also Caney, 2002: 106). But decent societies do not necessarily have
free institutions, especially those relevant to the ‘free exercise of reason’.
This undermines the basis for toleration at the international level. Second,
Rawls sometimes suggests that, given the fact that decent societies are open
to internal non-violent change, we create the conditions in which the evol-
ution of their institutions in a liberal direction becomes more likely by
treating them as equal members of international society (Beitz, 2001:
276–7). Again, this seems to be analogous with the domestic case in which
the (state-enforced) right of exit and the liberalizing effects of liberal public
policies on non-liberal ways of life mitigate the toleration of non-liberal
groups by putting in place indirect incentives towards liberalization.11 But
again the analogy breaks down, since the right of exit and the indirect
liberalizing effects of liberal public policies are absent in the international
sphere or at least severely constrained (Tan, 1998: 292–4).
Suppose, however, that we apply the general spirit of Rawls’s argument
to the situation concerning indigenous peoples in liberal states. These are
quasi-international relations since, as we have seen, although these groups
lack external sovereignty, they claim jurisdictional rights or political auth-
ority independent of the state. The general claim would be that there are
no grounds for interfering in indigenous societies as long as they remain
‘decent’ ones. Moreover – and here is a critical difference – since indigen-
ous people also possess basic citizenship rights in addition to any special
rights they have qua membership of an indigenous community, the conse-
quences of tolerating non-liberal practices are less severe than in the pure
international case. First, internal dissenters would have a guaranteed right
of exit, backed up by the state, but also the indirect effects of liberal prac-
tices in the wider community would be greater in this context, since indigen-
ous groups would not be able to completely insulate themselves from
them.12 So here is an example in which a corporate conception of group
rights is balanced against the concern for protecting individual liberal
rights.13 Still, it’s a difficult balancing act.
Consider an example for a moment. Suppose a young aboriginal girl is
brought up with the expectation that at an appropriate age (say, at 13) she
will be ‘promised’ to another man as his wife and with whom she will be
expected to live and have sexual relations.14 Assume, for argument’s sake,
that the laws and rules governing this relationship are widely known and
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accepted in the remote community in which she lives, including by her
parents and her extended family. But even in being brought up to know
‘what is expected of her’, she might, in fact, be unhappy or uncertain about
the arrangement and want to get out of it. Maybe she is unhappy about the
arrangement, but doesn’t say anything and goes along with it for the sake
of her family. Maybe she isn’t unhappy about the arrangement and doesn’t
even question it. Even if the relationship is morally correct relative to abor-
iginal customs – assuming that it is and that there are not conflicting judge-
ments about what is entailed in these circumstances (which is usually not
the case, as I shall return to in a moment) – whose interests should prevail?
Looking at it from the outside, in being ‘promised’ to someone in the first
place, various of the girl’s crucial interests to do with her freedom and
autonomy (her capacity to decide whom to marry, where to live, and so on)
have been grievously violated. We might think that the problem runs even
deeper, just insofar as the various informal conventions and norms within
that community lead her to think it is reasonable that she should have very
little control over whom she can marry or have sex with (see Okin, 1999).
What are her options? Go ahead with it despite her misgivings? Ask the
police to prosecute the ‘husband’? (According to criminal law, if her
‘husband’ has sex with her, he is probably committing rape.) Leave her
community? Try to change these customs and laws from within? All require
tremendous courage and strength on her part and all have significant costs,
most of which she will have to bear for herself. What kind of considerations
should guide liberal judgements in these particular cases?
I take it that the best solution would be to enable or empower her to
promote cultural change or accommodation of her interests from within,
such that she is not forced to choose between staying and losing her
freedom or leaving in order to gain a different and perhaps more difficult
freedom elsewhere. And this becomes more plausible when we realize that,
more often than not, the moral grounds for these practices within the
culture are much less clear and more contested than assumed. There are a
range of possibilities between coercive intervention and simple tolerance
that could be considered. Any solution should include the broadest possible
deliberation and consultation among all the parties involved, especially the
young women themselves. Coordinate jurisdiction, for example, might
create incentives that force community leaders to take into account the
interests of more vulnerable members of the group, but that also provide
‘escape clauses’ or ‘reversal points’ that individual members can invoke to
protect their basic interests (Ivison, 2002; Shachar, 2001; cf. Okin, 1998). Of
course, if these shared arrangements are impossible and the situation
serious enough, coercive intervention or exit may remain the only option.
Still, it might be that the kinds of ‘localized’ rights that would emerge
under such a regime would be objectionable for other kinds of reasons.
First, if aboriginal rights can be held only by aboriginal people, whether
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flowing exclusively from their distinctive customs and laws or as a collective
right to self-determination, does this not mean that rights are being assigned
according to descent (i.e. race), which violates basic notions of fairness and
equality before and under the law? And does this not entail a form of
biological or cultural essentialism that locks people into presumed ‘custom-
ary’ practices or communities and being treated as a member of a group
whether they want to be considered thus or not (Barry, 2001)? The short
answer is ‘no’, although there are always risks when institutionalizing group
rights – collective or corporate. First, indigenous peoples should not be seen
as fundamentally racial entities, but rather as political or, perhaps more
precisely, as constitutional ones. Historically, for example, the membership
rules of indigenous societies were not usually racialist and included various
means of incorporating new members from different ancestries and cultural
backgrounds.15 Thus, the grounds for treating indigenous people differently
when it comes to the distribution of resources, including land and sover-
eignty, are not based on race, but on historical and normative consider-
ations. They share a collective right to self-determination on the basis of
the interests that ground the right; namely, the value – in terms of its contri-
bution to individual wellbeing – of living in a self-determining community.
The fact that interests are the test here is important. They remain sensitive
to the views of the members who make up the group in question and they
have to be weighed against other considerations, including the conse-
quences of self-determination for those who don’t identify with the group,
but are affected by its claims.
But if indigenous peoples have political rights to self-determination,
then how can they also have equal rights to participate in Australian or
Canadian forms of government and citizenship? And don’t group rights,
whether corporate or collective, by providing protection for distinctive
political and cultural identities, fly in the face of the kind of civic commit-
ment required to realize liberal egalitarian ends? Barry, for example,
argues that, in the case of the Pueblo, ‘to be a Pueblo Indian is to have a
legal status that is equivalent to citizenship in a state’ (albeit a ‘sub-state
with delegated powers’) (2001: 189). The Pueblo cannot enjoy all of the
constitutional guarantees of US citizenship except by giving up ‘their
special rights that flow from their Pueblo Indian citizenship’. Since aspects
of Pueblo citizenship, such as a religious test determining the receipt of
membership benefits, violate liberal principles of justice, in order to retain
their ‘special political status’, the Pueblo ‘should be required to observe
the constraints on the use of political power that are imposed by liberal
justice’ (2001: 189). For Barry, the Pueblo are perfectly free to form them-
selves into a religiously exclusive community given liberal rights of
freedom of association and religion, but they cannot combine religious
exclusivity with the exercise of political power. In short, aboriginal rights
undermine the equality and freedom of individuals at the heart of liberal
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conceptions of citizenship. They also threaten the civic unity required for
effective and broadly-based social and economic programs aimed at
providing equal opportunity for all.
Barry therefore presents a sharp normative challenge to defenders of
aboriginal rights. What is the nature of the fit between aboriginal rights and
more general citizenship rights? Again, the problem is not exclusively one
of a clash between collective and individual goods. Both aboriginal rights
and citizenship rights are collective rights of a kind, since both define a
particular reference group within which a specific distribution of powers,
liberties and immunities should occur. Both are also culturally mediated in
various ways. Citizenship rights are not simply ‘applied liberalism, pure and
simple’, as Joseph Carens puts it, but rather are interpreted and applied
through distinctive legal and political institutions ‘with their own norms,
practices, interpretations and modes of reasoning’ (Carens, 2000: 192). The
problem lies in the differing content and scope of the interests to which they
refer.
Relying exclusively on the difference argument to explain the nature of
the fit between aboriginal rights and citizenship rights does not work, as we
have seen, since it either simply ignores the problem or ties the interests
related to those rights to a very narrow set of supposedly ‘customary’ prac-
tices. On the other hand, simply asserting that indigenous peoples have
already consented to being incorporated into the state (as Barry does, since
for him any political powers that aboriginal peoples hold are ‘delegated’
powers) begs the question as well. So a better justification has to be found.
Aboriginal rights relate to those particular interests to do with territory,
culture and self-government that distinguish indigenous peoples from other
kinds of groups in states like Australia, Canada or the US. These interests
are distinctive because they relate to the fact of aboriginal prior occupancy
of and jurisdiction over these territories and to the difficulties they face in
maintaining their distinctive cultural practices and ways of life. The
argument justifying the protection of these interests through legally
enforceable rights appeals to equality, but not only to the equal provision
of the means to preserve culture. Other interests are also at stake.
First, aboriginal rights promote the formal equality of peoples who were
previously considered in both international and domestic law as politically
(and culturally) inferior and thus undeserving of equal consideration.
Second, they promote equality in the substantive sense, as providing the
means of enabling indigenous groups to address the social and economic
disadvantages they suffer from, taking into account their unique historical
circumstances (this is partly an empirical claim; see Ivison, 2002: 151–4).
This aspect of the argument also has considerable political advantages.
People are more likely to support political arrangements that encourage
self-government if they feel it will improve the actual lives of ordinary
indigenous peoples as opposed to a narrow group of elites. So the
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combination of remedial and substantive aspects of equality-based justifi-
cations is an attractive feature of this argument. The aim is to help secure
the ‘real freedoms’ of indigenous peoples – the basic capabilities they
require for living decent lives.16
To return to Barry’s charge directly, what about the fit between aborigi-
nal rights, citizenship rights and human rights? There are two issues here.
First, the fit may be awkward to the extent that aboriginal rights allow depar-
tures from liberal norms of citizenship. Should we tolerate such departures?
It all depends on the specific claim in each case. And it also depends, as I
argued above, on the extent to which those subject to the norm have had a
chance to have their say about it. The more asymmetric the relation of
power and the less scope for broad deliberation about the consequences of
the norms in question, the more we should be concerned. But this means
negotiation and compromise on all sides. Given their history of being subject
to coercive assimilation by the state – often through the very language of
‘equal citizenship rights’ – it is unreasonable to expect indigenous peoples
to see citizenship rights as providing, in themselves, an unproblematic frame-
work for a ‘common emancipatory project’ (as Barry claims they do),
especially if it involves foregoing their collective interests in property and
self-government. The state has not acted impartially towards indigenous
peoples in the past, and thus they have often turned to other sources –
including international law – to support their claims.17 But it is striking that,
in appealing to international law, indigenous representatives and negotia-
tors have been willing to commit themselves to the broad spectrum of
human rights and not just the right to self-determination.18 Moreover,
appeals to aboriginal rights in domestic law are frequently made on the basis
of claims about equality (Borrows, 1997; Macklem, 2000; Report of the Royal
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, 1996). Having said that, accommo-
dation will probably mean tolerating various departures from liberal norms.
Thus, the fit between aboriginal rights and liberal rights will be an uneasy
one at times and closer to a modus vivendi as opposed to an overlapping
consensus – but this is truer to the nature of the relation between indigen-
ous peoples and the state anyway (see Ivison, 2002: 84–8, 138).
The other issue concerning the fit between aboriginal rights and citizen-
ship rights is a version of the ‘West Lothian’ question. Why should aborigi-
nal people have relatively exclusive jurisdiction over their own affairs, but
also expect to participate in broader political institutions? A quick answer
to this question is that aboriginal rights are usually conceived as coexisting
with those of the Crown, as opposed to being mutually exclusive, and thus
the problem is one of developing shared and coordinate forms of jurisdic-
tion. Still, fairness might be an issue. Aboriginal citizens, if they were to
enjoy extensive self-government rights and title to their lands, might enjoy
rights that other non-indigenous citizens would not, which has certainly been
an explosive political issue in Australia (and elsewhere) in recent years.
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There are a number of ways to respond to these concerns. First, in
federal systems like Australia and Canada, political arrangements positively
encourage the simultaneous integration and separation of different com-
munities; that is, complex forms of interdependence between different
jurisdictions and modes of identification. Australian citizens have both their
local/regional interests represented at the state level and their national ones
at the federal level. Aboriginal rights can be seen as simply adding another
layer to such complex interdependence and identity, allowing aboriginal
people to benefit equally from federalism in a way that non-indigenous
Australian and Canadian citizens have (see Borrows, 2000: 338–9). Second,
as already mentioned, aboriginal communities or nations are not racial
entities, but political ones, and thus it is false to say that rights or privileges
are being distributed exclusively along racial or ethnic lines. But member-
ship is a deeply contested and controversial issue for both indigenous and
non-indigenous citizens. Some aboriginal groups have argued that racialist
criteria for membership are justified given the extremely limited resources
they possess and the need to control for the growth and integrity of their
communities (Alfred, 1995). Others have argued that non-racialist criteria
can achieve those ends just as well and are thus morally and politically
preferable (Borrows, 2000: 339–40; see also Macklem, 2000: 231).
Aboriginal rights turn out to refer to a complex bundle of interests, the
protection and promotion of which have to be justified to others. But why
still refer to them as aboriginal rights? Some have suggested that the phrase
should be abandoned because the fact that someone is aboriginal is not
really salient to the justification of the interests at stake, which are, in prin-
ciple, also valuable for other individuals and groups (Brock, 2002: 292, 296).
First, it is up to indigenous peoples themselves to decide how to talk
about their claims, but I think that there are strong historical and practical
reasons for thinking that aboriginal (or indigenous) rights are a valid way
of doing so. As we have seen, they refer to a distinctive set of claims that
distinguish indigenous peoples from other kinds of groups. In Canada, for
example, ‘aboriginal rights’ refer to a specific set of legal and constitutional
claims that emerged through interactions and negotiations between
indigenous peoples and the state over the last 500 years. Thus they form
part of the constitutional relationship between First Nations and the Crown
and have become embedded in the Canadian constitution and the ongoing
treaty process.19 In this context, therefore, it does not make sense to ‘lose’
reference to aboriginal rights, since they are doing real work in the evolving
cross-cultural set of norms and practices governing Crown-First Nation
relations. In other contexts (such as Australia, where there is little history
or practice of treaty-making), more generic language to do with self-
determination or citizenship rights might be expected to be more prevalent.
But even here, given, first, the shared common law background and mutual
influence between Canadian and Australian jurisprudence; second,
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developments in the international law of indigenous peoples; and, third, the
political working out of the consequences of the Mabo decision, the idea of
indigenous rights still retains plenty of critical purchase (see Behrendt,
2001b).
So the term ‘aboriginal rights’ reinforces the claim that the rights in
question refer specifically to the historical situation of indigenous peoples
and especially to claims over their traditional lands and to their rights to
self-government as peoples or nations. But these rights still have to be
justified to others, and that means appealing to general norms and interests
that are valuable for others too. I think the best arguments are those that
appeal to substantive conceptions of equality and wellbeing, as argued
above. However, it does not follow that the ‘aboriginal’ in ‘aboriginal rights’
is redundant. Constitutions – written and unwritten – distribute power in
the form of rights and jurisdiction between different kinds of legal actors,
including individuals, groups, institutions and governments (Macklem,
2000: 21). Aboriginal rights refer to those powers and capacities that are a
necessary (although hardly sufficient) condition of aboriginal peoples being
treated equally, given the legacy of colonialism and the challenges they face
today in living decent lives according to their own lights.
CONCLUSION
Is the notion of aboriginal rights morally coherent? Does rights talk, in this
instance, entrench ethnic or cultural divisions and make accommodation
and dialogue more difficult?
I have tried to argue that there are not only legal grounds for thinking
that aboriginal rights exist, but also good moral ones. Rights claims are not
self-justifying; rights are only effective to the extent that they are morally
and institutionally enforceable. But the willingness of others to bear the
burdens of their enforcement depends on an acceptance of the ends or
purposes for which they are said to exist. My argument has been that a
successful defense of aboriginal rights will tie them to the promotion of the
equal freedom and wellbeing of aboriginal peoples, taken individually and
collectively, and understood in both the formal and substantive sense.
Of course, rights are not the be all and end all of politics. We have duties
that are not reducible to claims about rights and we can be free or
constrained in ways that do not depend on the possession or violation of
our rights. Moreover, if aboriginal rights are unenforceable or make no
positive difference to the actual lives of aboriginal peoples, then we have
good reason to doubt their usefulness (as Alfred, 1999 powerfully points
out). But there is nothing inherent to the language of rights itself that is
incompatible with the kinds of ends that aboriginal peoples pursue. The
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indeterminacy and yet wide acceptance of the language of rights mean that
they can be (re)translated and put to work in new contexts and circum-
stances (see Borrows, 1997: 171).
Finally, what do we learn about rights claims in cross-cultural contexts?
One thing that emerges is that rights are intimately related to norms. This
is true of both group rights and individual rights. Group rights can
immunize particular cultural norms from external interference (to a
degree) and thus align and shape individual behavior in culturally-specific
ways. But so too can individual rights, either directly by aligning individual
behavior with the dominant cultural norms of a liberal society, or indirectly
by promoting certain collective values. So the question is not whether or
not cultural norms shape rights, but rather what kind of norms act as
preconditions for freedom and which do not. Norms insinuate themselves
into choices. Determining which norms are enabling or constraining draws
us into arguments over the nature of human wellbeing which can sometimes
conflict with the ideas of toleration and ‘recognition’ that underlie many of
the arguments of liberal multiculturalists. However, this tension is unavoid-
able and is constitutive of democratic politics in multinational and multi-
cultural societies today.
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Notes
1
[W]hy has a social breakdown accompanied [the] advancement of the formal
rights of our people, not the least the recognition and restoration of our
lands . . . why during the period of indigenous policy enlightenment and
recognition and despite billions of dollars and much improved housing and
infrastructure and government services, there has been a corresponding
social deterioration. What is the explanation for this paradoxical result?
(Pearson, 2001)
2 More specifically, ‘X has a right if and only if X can have rights, and other things
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being equal, an aspect of X’s well-being is a sufficient reason for holding some
other person(s) to be under a duty’ (Raz, 1986: 166).
3 I am grateful to an anonymous reader for pushing me to be clearer about my
claims in this section.
4 Other kinds of rights can be created by statute, as in Canada by the Indian Act.
This created specific entitlements for ‘registered’ or ‘status’ Indians who live,
for the most part, on reservations. However, the Act has been bitterly criticized
by First Nations in Canada as an instrument of colonial rule and thus is not
considered a legitimate source of those rights.
5 Jeremy Waldron has argued that, although collective goods can be used to
justify individual rights, ultimately the best justification appeals to individual
interests, not communal ones. This is because the whole point of rights claims
is to tie them directly to the interests of individuals as opposed to communal or
societal ones. It does not make sense to say, ‘X has a right to peace’, for
example, as much as it would be a good thing if peace prevailed, since one
cannot enjoy peace individually, but rather only in conjunction with others (see
Waldron, 1993: 360–1).
6 There are limits, of course, to using societal interests to justify basic rights. The
right not to be tortured, for example, seems to be tied directly to our individual
interest in not being harmed and only very indirectly, if at all, to societal
interests or communal goods. Then again, part of the argument against ‘torture
warrants’ to extract information from terrorists is surely not simply the harm
done to the individuals in question, but also to the collective good of the rule
of law, something we certainly benefit from individually, but can only enjoy in
conjunction with others in the context of a general legal system.
7 I am indebted in this paragraph to Kymlicka (1995) and Post (2000).
8 Note that, although aboriginal title is a form of collective title, individuals may
– depending on the particular laws and customs – acquire individual property
rights within that communal title.
9 I am indebted here to the excellent discussion in Jones (1999a).
10 See Rawls (1999: 65ff.) for the list of basic rights that Rawls thinks a society
must respect in order to be considered decent, but not liberal. They include
basic rights to life (subsistence and security), liberty (freedom from slavery,
serfdom, liberty of conscience), property and formal equality. These fall short
of the kinds of rights listed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
other international human rights documents. Note especially that the list does
not include a right to democratic institutions, voting rights or clearly delineated
freedoms of speech and expression.
11 On the right of (internal) exit, see Rawls (1993: 221); on the impossibility of
neutrality of effect, see Rawls (1993: 192–4, 199–200). I leave aside the issue of
whether or not these are adequate for protecting the kind of interests that
liberals value or, conversely, whether they violate the spirit of political liberal-
ism itself. For further discussion, see Okin (1994).
12 This is particularly true with regard to the language of rights. Needless to say,
this might not be considered necessarily a good thing by members of the
indigenous communities themselves. For an interesting discussion of the impact
of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms on First Nation politics, see
Borrows (1997).
ETHNICITIES 3(3)
 at UNIV OF WESTERN ONTARIO on August 19, 2012etn.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
341
13 Note that, in the US, the Indian Civil Rights Act (1968) imposed certain human
rights obligations on American Indian tribal courts and governments, among
which are: a right to the free exercise of religion (although it does not prevent
a tribe from establishing a religion); freedom of speech; freedom from unrea-
sonable search and seizures; a right to trial by jury (in criminal but not civil
cases) and to a speedy and public trial. Violations of these rights can be pursued
through the tribal courts themselves. The only federal court remedy available
is that a person may seek a writ of habeas corpus to test the legality of his or
her detention when being held in jail or detained by his or her tribe (once all
tribal remedies have been exhausted or if serious injury would result from any
delay). In Canada, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982) is
intended to apply (precisely how is still unclear) to the ‘inherent’ rights of the
aboriginal First Nations, which are protected, although not defined, in Part II,
Section 35 of the Constitution. For a nuanced discussion, see Macklem (2000:
194–233).
14 The example is taken from an actual case, ‘Victim of Dual Cultures’, The
Australian (9 October 2002: 1). For similar pressures in a different cultural
context, see ‘Young Brides Stir: New Outcry on Utah Polygamy’, New York
Times (24 February 2002: A1, A23).
15 The issues here are complex. For example, more than half of indigenous people
in Canada live off reserve, and the rates of intermarriage are increasing both
there and in Australia. Interestingly, self-identification as ‘aboriginal’ or
‘indigenous’ has also increased markedly, along with indigenous birth rates
(especially relative to the non-indigenous population). Not surprisingly, at the
same time, resources earmarked for indigenous peoples have become increas-
ingly stretched. This has resulted in bitter disputes over who is or is not ‘really’
indigenous and thus eligible for these benefits and, in Australia at least, calls for
the introduction of DNA testing, and so on. Note that the blood quantum rules
that characterize some aboriginal nations today in Canada (and the US) are in
fact the result of rules imposed by the 19th-century Indian Act and not the
nations themselves, although some have embraced them subsequently. I take it
that blood quantum rules are indefensible on liberal grounds. The Report of the
Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (1996) calls for an elimination of
blood quantum rules and the adoption of more ‘inclusive and non-racialist
bases’ for membership, which they claim are more in keeping with indigenous
traditions anyway.
16 The language here is borrowed from the work of Sen (1999) and Nussbaum
(2000). For a more detailed defense of aboriginal rights along these lines, see
Ivison (2002: Ch. 6).
17 Basic citizenship rights were initially denied and then often imposed without
any attempt to acknowledge claims about indigenous peoples’ political or treaty
rights. A notorious example was the Canadian government’s 1969 White Paper.
For a discussion, see Boldt and Long (1985). For a discussion of the Australian
context, see Chesterman and Galligan (1997). For discussions of indigenous
people and international law, see Anaya (1996), Pritchard (1998) and Venne
(1998).
18 See, for example, the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
(Articles 33, 43, 45) as well as discussions about the applicability of the
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Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to aboriginal self-government in
Borrows (1997) and Macklem (2000: 194–233).
19 For two important judicial interpretations of aboriginal rights, see R. v Sparrow
(1990) and R. v van der Peet (1996). For a critical analysis of judicial trends in
defining aboriginal rights in Canada, see Asch (1999).
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